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‘”Mortal in this season”: Union Surgeons and the Narrative of Medical 
Modernisation in the American Civil War.’ 
 
 
Abstract: The impact of the American Civil War on medical modernisation is 
increasingly being recognized, yet the ways in which the Civil War challenged 
and changed doctors’ understanding of their professional role during the war 
remains underappreciated. By juxtaposing Union doctors’ personal and 
professional responses to the Civil War with the wider public reaction to Union 
medical care, this paper explores the tensions that arose between the public 
and the professional perceptions of medicine as these developed on the 
battlefields of the nation’s internecine conflict. It argues that the intersection 
between the positive and negative narratives of Union medical provision, 
specifically surgery, established an important discursive space within which 
Union doctors could negotiate their public and professional status. It finds that 
the negative narrative, so far from a hindrance was instrumental to the 
process of medical modernisation by enabling Union physicians to define, 
defend, and develop a more modern medical role. 
 
Key Words: American Civil War; Union; surgeons; professionalisation; 
medical modernisation. 
 
Writing to his sister in Canada during the Wilderness (Overland) Campaign, 
the last great push of the Northern armies against the Southern Confederacy 
in Virginia, Union surgeon Francis Wafer observed that some of ‘the darkest 
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pages in the annals of human misery are continually opening before me.’ ‘Not 
only every day since’ the Battle of the Wilderness began, he told her, but 
‘frequently all night has the roar & the thunder of artillery & the spiteful 
everlasting crack of rifles been grinding in our ears. Every foot of ground for 
(40) forty miles has been fought for’, and the human cost was high; ‘many of 
the wounds of the enlisted men’, he noted, ‘will prove Mortal in this season.’1  
Wafer, of course, was not wrong. In just over one month some 30,000 
men, or around 20 percent of the total forces deployed (c.160,000) by Union 
and Confederate forces combined, were killed or wounded in the course of 
the many battles, from Spotsylvania Court House through Cold Harbor, fought 
in May and early June, 1864, that comprised the Wilderness Campaign. Of 
those, only some four thousand were immediate combat fatalities. Disease, as 
was recognized at the time and has been stressed endlessly since, was by far 
the most effective killer of the Civil War, accounting for around two-thirds of 
the war’s fatalities. And the actual number of fatalities has recently been 
revised upwards from the long-accepted figure of some 620,000 to around 
750,000. Less than a decade after Civil War historian Mark Neely asserted 
that historians were no longer it ‘at risk of underestimating the destruction of’ 
the Civil War, he was contradicted by J. David Hacker’s census-based 
recount of the war’s white, male death toll and challenged still further by Jim 
                                                 
1 Francis M. Wafer quoted in Cheryl A. Wells, ed, A Surgeon in the Army of 
the Potomac (Montreal and London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2008), 
119. 
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Downs’s analysis of the dire health implications attendant upon emancipation 
for many thousands of African-Americans.2  
Both Hacker and Downs have identified some remaining gaps in our 
understanding of the demographic impact of disease and death in the Civil 
War.3 And their conclusions inevitably shine the spotlight on Civil War 
medicine. Mortality rates, they find, were materially conditioned by the poor 
standards of Civil War medical care, with Downs, in particular, critiquing the 
refusal on the part of many Civil War doctors ‘to heed the lessons learned 
                                                 
2 Mark E. Neely, Jr., The Civil War and the Limits of Destruction (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 218. J. David Hacker has revised the 
generally accepted figures for the Civil War dead upwards, from c.620,000 to 
a top figure of c.851,000, with c.750,000 soldier deaths, a rise of 20 percent. 
See Hacker, ‘A Census-Based Count of the Civil War Dead’, Civil War 
History, 2011, 57, 307-348; Jim Downs, Sick From Freedom: African-
American Illness and Suffering during the Civil War and Reconstruction (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
3 Earlier discussions of the fallibility of the numbers game in the Civil War 
include Drew Gilpin Faust, ‘“Numbers on Top of Numbers”: Counting the Civil 
War Dead’, Journal of Military History, 2006, 70, 995-1009; and Faust, This 
Republic of Suffering: Death and the American Civil War (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2008), 250-261. See also Alfred Jay Bollet, Civil War Medicine: 
Challenges and Triumphs (Tucson, Arizona: The Galen Press, 2002), 283-
363. 
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from earlier epochs.’4 It is more frequently those medical lessons learned from 
later epochs, of course, that muddy the medical waters as far as the Civil War 
is concerned. Civil War medicine, its surgery more specifically, is perhaps too 
readily relegated to a pre-modern world, a world that George Worthington 
Adams described as ‘the very last years of the medical middle ages’.5 It may 
be no surprise that the martial celebration of the nation’s history that was the 
Civil War Centennial (1961-65) prompted one doctor to introduce a healthy 
dose of reality to proceedings by echoing Adams and declaring that Civil War 
medicine represented ‘pre-Listerian surgery at its zenith’. The memory of the 
war, he proposed, might best ‘be kept green by its dreadful medical history.’6 
                                                 
4 Hacker, ‘A Census-Based Count’, 315, n.13; Downs, Sick from Freedom, 32. 
Downs does nevertheless acknowledge that the federal government simply 
‘lacked the money, resources, and infrastructure to respond to the medical 
crises that erupted throughout the war.’ Ibid., 30. 
5 George Worthington Adams, ‘Confederate Medicine’, The Journal of 
Southern History, 1940, 6, 151-166, 151; the phrase ‘medical middle ages’ is 
originally ascribed to William A. Hammond in Faust, This Republic of 
Suffering, 4. 
6 D LI Griffiths, ‘Medicine and Surgery in the American Civil War’, Proceedings 
of the Royal Society of Medicine, 1966, 59, 204-208, 208; that Griffiths was 
influenced by the Centennial is suggested by his argument’s timing and by the 
fact that earlier medical histories tended to present a more positive 
perspective on Civil War procedures and their lasting impact, e.g., Courtney 
R. Hall, ‘The Rise of Professional Surgery in the United States: 1800-1865’, 
Bulletin of the History of Medicine, 1952, 26, 231-62. 
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What is perhaps more surprising is how few historians have contradicted this 
conclusion since. Civil War surgery, according to Ira Rutkow, made little 
headway over the war years themselves, and remained ‘as barbaric and 
crude in 1865 as it was in 1861.’7 Civil War soldiers suffered and died, E. 
Moore Quinn has more recently concurred, largely because of ‘ignorance, 
superstition, and poor medical techniques.’8 
Yet those who, with Alfred Jay Bollet, would challenge, or at least 
modify such assertions perhaps too readily ascribe Civil War medicine’s 
negative image to ‘generational chauvinism’ on the part of scholars 
determined to judge the past by the standards of the present.9 Alternatively, 
                                                 
7 Ira Rutkow, Bleeding Blue and Gray: Civil War Surgery and the Evolution of 
American Medicine (New York: Random House, 2005), 318. 
8 E. Moore Quinn, ‘”I have been trying very hard to be powerful ‘nice’…”: the 
correspondence of Sister M. De Sales (Brennan) during the American Civil 
War’, Irish Studies Review, 2010, 18, 213-233, 220. For additional recent 
negative assessments of Civil War doctors see also Michael Sappol, A Traffic 
of Dead Bodies: Anatomy and Embodied Social Identity in Nineteenth-Century 
America (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002), 238; 
Frances M. Clarke, War Stories: Suffering and Sacrifice in the Civil War North 
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 66; and Wells 
(ed.), Surgeon in the Army of the Potomac, xxix. 
9 Bollet, Civil War Medicine, 38, quoting William Manchester in the New York 
Times Book Review, 4 February 1990, 33; see also Bollet, ‘Amputations in the 
Civil War’, in James M. Schmidt and Guy R. Hasegawa, eds, Years of 
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Rutkow has suggested that the problem resides in the ‘[p]omp and 
circumstance [that] masks the deadly ferociousness of the battlefield’ and 
obfuscates both ‘the slaughter and medical realities inherent to war.’10 And 
Shauna Devine has recently identified the separation of Civil War medicine 
from nineteenth-century medical developments more generally as a barrier to 
our comprehension of the conflict’s scientific and surgical impact. Neither 
those who would restore medicine as a central component of the Civil War, 
however, nor those who would establish the Civil War as a central component 
of the history of medicine have fully integrated contemporary public with 
professional narratives—positive and negative—of medical practice and 
procedure into their analyses either of Civil War medicine in general, Civil War 
surgery in particular, or the larger story of medical modernization in the 
nineteenth century.11 The scholarly tendency, identified by Roger Cooter, to 
                                                                                                                                            
Change and Suffering: Modern Perspectives on Civil War Medicine 
(Minnesota: Edinborough Press, 2009), 57-58; Bollet, Civil War Medicine, 76. 
10 Rutkow, Bleeding Blue and Gray, xii. 
11 Shauna Devine, ‘Producing Knowledge: Civil War Bodies and the 
Development of Scientific Medicine in Nineteenth Century America’ 
(unpublished PhD thesis, University of Western Ontario, 2010). Devine has 
established a strong case for the Civil War as central in the development of 
new, scientific approaches to medicine in the United States. Her focus, 
consequently, is on the medical elite’s impetus to develop and disseminate 
medical knowledge through, for example, the collection of material for the 
Army Medical Museum (AMM) and the publication of Joseph K. Barnes (ed), 
The Medical and Surgical History of the War of the Rebellion (henceforth 
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reify ‘both war and medicine, privileging them from the societies and cultures 
in which they were set’ remains a problem in the case of America’s civil war. 
Consequently, important clues concerning the public dimension of medical 
modernization in the mid-nineteenth century risk being overlooked.12 
This paper suggests that in order to clarify the process of medical 
modernisation in the nineteenth century, the negative representations of Civil 
War medicine need to be confronted as well as, possibly, contradicted. Over 
two decades ago now, Bonnie Blustein proposed a framework for a more 
contextualized comprehension of Civil War medicine, particularly in regard to 
the ‘interconnected structure of ideology, social relations, and material needs’ 
within which it was located.13 By juxtaposing Union surgeons’ personal and 
professional responses to the Civil War with the wider public reaction to Union 
medical care, this paper examines one aspect of the social context of Civil 
War medical care that is sometimes lost in the detail: the inevitable tensions 
between the martial and the medical, the public and the professional as these 
developed over the course of the conflict. It suggests that the intersection 
created between the positive and negative perceptions of Union medical 
provision, but specifically surgery, effectively constituted an important 
                                                                                                                                            
MSHWR), 6 Vols. (Washington, DC.: US Government Printing Office, 1870-
1888). 
12 Roger Cooter, ‘Medicine and the Goodness of War’, Canadian Bulletin of 
the History of Medicine, 1990, 7, 147-159, 151. 
13 Bonnie Ellen Blustein, ‘”To Increase the Efficiency of the Medical 
Department”: A New Approach to U.S. Civil War Medicine’, Civil War History, 
1987, 33, 22-41, 24, 41. 
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discursive space within which medical reformers could negotiate their public 
and professional status. And it argues that the negative narrative was 
especially instrumental in respect of the contradictions within this space, 
particularly in the challenge this offered Civil War physicians to define, defend 
and develop a modern medical role. 
 
A Profession on Trial 
 
In his memoirs of the Civil War, former Union surgeon John H. Brinton 
recalled the chaos that was the Union medical corps in the autumn of 1861 
when ‘officers fresh from civil life were called upon at a moment’s notice, and 
without previous training’, to provide medical care.14 The volunteer surgeon 
and the soldier had much in common in 1861; both were embarking on a 
venture for which civilian life had provided little preparation but one 
accompanied by a widespread assumption, reinforced through popular 
journals as well as dedicated medical publications, that professional 
competence, be it martial or medical, would be achieved, and that in pretty 
short order. This point is worth stressing, since the negative narrative of Civil 
War medical care has often acquired, in hindsight, a certain grim inevitability 
that blurs the complexity of contemporary responses. Frequently blurred, too, 
is the distinction between the component parts of the medical profession in 
Union service and the United States Sanitary Commission (USSC), the main 
                                                 
14 John H. Brinton, Personal Memoirs of John H. Brinton, Civil War Surgeon, 
1861-1865 (1891. Reprint. Carbondale and Edwardsville, Southern Illinois 
University Press, 1996), 54. 
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Union volunteer body for the sanitary relief of the armies whose perspective 
has tended to influence if not dominate scholarly assessments of Union 
medicine. 
For those elite northerners who established the USSC, the outbreak of 
Civil War may, as Blustein observed, have ‘suggested the horrifying spectre of 
another Crimea’, and through their emphasis on the appalling conditions at 
Scutari and throughout the Bosporus they effectively signalled the significance 
of their voluntary efforts.15 Not everyone, however, believed that the Civil War 
would be a case of the Crimea redux. On the contrary, the message about 
medicine at war promulgated by the popular and widely-read journal, the 
Atlantic Monthly, was a positive one.16 Through the work of Florence 
Nightingale, the journal argued, the horrors of Napoleonic campaigning had 
been mitigated, not by advances in medical knowledge, but by improvements 
in medical care. In the Crimea, it asserted, in rather a triumph of optimism 
over reality, ‘[r]ecovery had become the rule, and death a remarkable event.’17 
                                                 
15 Blustein, ‘To Increase the Efficiency of the Medical Department’, 26-27. 
16 Bollet also highlights the familiarity of the American public with events in the 
Crimea, and with Solferino (1859) but he links both to public concern over 
troop treatment rather than arguing, as I do here, that the Crimean 
comparison served, at least on one level, to reassure Americans that the Civil 
War was going to be different from ‘those European tragedies’. Bollet, Civil 
War Medicine, 8-9. For contemporary public discussion of the Crimea, see for 
example, The Liberator, 10 November, 1854. 
17 ‘Health in the Hospital’, Atlantic Monthly, 1861, 8, 718-730, 730, 720-1. On 
the reality of death and disease rates in the Crimean conflict see John 
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In a similar vein, Scientific American, at the time a publication aimed at 
an audience with a general rather than a professional interest in both 
mechanical and medical developments, also cited comparative evidence from 
the Crimea regarding the improvements in sustaining both the morale and 
physical well-being of troops.18 Whilst the ‘great enemy to be feared’, as it 
reminded its readers, ‘was not the one who came with powder and ball, but 
disease’, the assumption that lessons had been learned was evident.19 
Modern soldiers, according to Scientific American, fought more bravely in the 
presence of ‘an effective medical corps’. Even if they were wounded by ‘a ball 
or a bayonet thrust’ they could confidently assume that ‘their surgeon would 
                                                                                                                                            
Shepherd, The Crimean Doctors: A History of the British Medical Services in 
the Crimean War, 2 Vols. (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1991), esp. 
Vol. II, 361-71; 591-2; Fielding H. Garrison, Notes on the History of Military 
Medicine (Washington: Association of Military Surgeons, 1922), 171-2; and for 
a more general account, Orlando Figes, Crimea: The Last Crusade (London: 
Allen Lane, 2010), 302-3.  
18 Dedicated medical journals were numerous in this period, but this article, 
seeking to establish the more popular perception of medicine during the Civil 
War, has largely, although not entirely, concentrated on journals with a more 
general, and wider readership. On medical publishing see James H. Cassedy, 
‘The Flourishing and Character of Early American Medical Journalism’, The 
Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences, 1983, 38, 135-150. 
19 Scientific American, 1861, 4, 403; and see James M. Schmidt, ‘”A 
Multiplicity of Ingenious Articles”: Civil War Medicine and Scientific American 
Magazine’, in Schmidt and Hasegawa, Years of Change and Suffering, 37-55. 
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extract it...and it was distinction ever after’, for surgeon and soldier alike. 20 
For many Americans in 1861, therefore, the evidence from previous conflicts 
suggested that important advances had been made, by armies in general and 
their medical divisions in particular, regarding the sanitary and surgical 
aspects of what, from the perspective of the time, was regarded as modern 
warfare. Allied to this was the further assumption that the United States, but 
especially the Union side of the Civil War equation, was uniquely positioned to 
field armies more capable of meeting both the medical and military challenges 
of conflict than those in the past had proved to be. 
Even after the initial upsurge of enthusiasm, what minister and author 
Edward Everett Hale later recalled as ‘the passion of a beginning’, had 
subsided somewhat in the face of the Civil War’s martial and medical realities 
it was still argued in the pages of the Atlantic Monthly, by no less a figure than 
noted epidemiologist Edward Jarvis, that the ‘Union army is one of the 
healthiest on record’. Jarvis ascribed this to ‘the better intelligence of the age 
and of our people’, although it was, of course, relative. Despite his belief in the 
efficacy of both the people and their politicians to approach warfare in a more 
professional manner than the European nations were then managing, Jarvis 
acknowledged the ‘the depressing and exhaustive force of military life’, and 
noted that the ‘rate of sickness’ for Union troops was far greater than for 
civilian non-combatants. His enthusiasm for the combined efforts of the USSC 
and ‘the universal sympathy of the men and women of the land’ in ‘lessening 
the discomforts and alleviating the sufferings of the Army of Freedom’ was, 
                                                 
20 Scientific American, ‘The French Ambulance System’, 1861, 5, 3. 
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nevertheless, designed to encourage and not dismay readers of the Atlantic 
Monthly in the second, and most trying, year of the war for the Union.21 
Yet in highlighting the efforts of the USSC, Jarvis unwittingly helped 
establish at least part of the groundwork upon which the negative reputation 
of Civil War medicine would later be constructed. Although there was a 
significant degree of overlap, both in terms of medical personnel and 
publications produced during the war, between the USSC and the Army 
Medical Department in regard to the treatment of Union troops, the former 
effectively overshadowed the latter as far as the public perception of sanitary 
support was concerned. The USSC came to be regarded as Jarvis described 
it, as the main means of alleviating the suffering of Union soldiers. Its very 
existence, indeed, highlighted what USSC treasurer George Templeton 
Strong condemned as the ‘criminal and scandalous’ inefficiency of the Army 
Medical Department in the war’s early stages. That the Union’s Medical 
Department was, as Strong charged, ‘utterly unequal to [its] present work’ was 
possibly inevitable given that, as Strong acknowledged, it had fallen into 
‘routine habits acquired in long dealing with an army of ten or fifteen thousand’ 
rather than field armies in excess of 100,000 men.22 The Army of the Potomac 
was a case in point. When Jonathan Letterman, its newly-appointed medical 
                                                 
21 Edward Everett Hale, ‘The United States Sanitary Commission’, Atlantic 
Monthly, 1867, 19, 416-429, quotation 417; Edward Jarvis, ‘Sanitary Condition 
of the Army’, Atlantic Monthly, 1861, 10, 463-497, 473, 475. 
22 Allan Nevins and Milton Halsey Thomas, eds, The Diary of George 
Templeton Strong, 4 Vols. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952), III, 
181. 
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director arrived on the James River at the start of July, 1862, it comprised 
about 120,000 troops. And the scale of the medical problem, largely, as 
Letterman recalled, the result of scurvy plus the effects of ‘marching and 
fighting in such a region, in such weather, with lack of food, want of rest, great 
excitement, and the depression necessarily consequent upon it’ was 
immediately apparent.23 
 What Letterman encountered was a problem that had plagued the 
Union’s first major campaign in Virginia from the start. The difficulties were 
largely logistical. Charles S. Tripler, the beleaguered medical director whom 
Letterman had come to replace, was hardly inexperienced in military medical 
matters, having served in the Mexican War. His first official report from the 
Civil War, however, comprised a catalogue of complaints concerning the 
general ineptitude he encountered, and by the time he ceded control to 
Letterman the situation had not improved.24 Only with the advent of the 
‘Letterman System’ did the positive, but largely post-war narrative of medical 
managerial modernisation in the Civil War begin to gather momentum. From 
                                                 
23 Jonathan Letterman, Medical Recollections of the Army of the Potomac 
(New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1866), 6-7, 9. 
24 Charles A, Tripler to US Surgeon General William A. Hammond, quoted in 
Wafer, Surgeon in the Army of the Potomac, xxxiv; Charles S. Tripler, ‘Report 
of Surgeon Charles S. Tripler, Medical Director of the Army of the Potomac, of 
the Operations of the Medical Department of that Army from August 12, 1861, 
to March 17, 1862’, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official 
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1880-1901), henceforth ORA, Series 1, Vol. 5 (XIV) 86-89. 
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the successful removal of the wounded from the field after Fredericksburg to 
the organisation of functioning field and general hospitals, Union medical care 
is generally understood to have achieved an upward trajectory of gradual but 
consistent sanitary improvement and professional progress.25 
Contemporary opinion was rather different, however. As one doctor 
from Ohio complained, northern newspapers generally focussed on the 
                                                 
25 For extended discussions of the ‘Letterman System’ see Frank R. Freemon, 
Gangrene and Glory: Medical Care During the American Civil War (Urbana 
and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2001), 67-76; Garrison, Notes on the 
History of Military Medicine, 174-6; Bollet, Civil War Medicine, 97-141. 
Positive contemporary (although mainly post-war) assessments of the 
‘Letterman System,’ especially as that related to the ambulance system, 
include that by Charles O’Leary, medical director of the Sixth Corps, quoted in 
Bennett A. Clements, Memoir of Jonathan Letterman, in Journal of the Military 
Service Institution, 1883, IV, 10-11; on the treatment of the wounded at 
Fredericksburg, see Gordon W. Jones, ‘The Medical History of the 
Fredericksburg Campaign: Course and Significance’, Journal of the History of 
Medicine, 1863, 18, 241-56 and George C. Rable, Fredericksburg! 
Fredericksburg! (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002). 
Support for troops on the field was still an issue, and the subject of a lengthy 
exchange in the Christian Examiner, in the latter stages of the war (January, 
1864); and see Have We the Best Possible Ambulance System (Boston: 
Walker, Wise and Company, 1864). For an overview of the subject, see John 
S. Haller, Jr., Farmcarts to Fords: A History of the Military Ambulance, 1790-
1925 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992).  
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perceived ‘[i]nefficiency, gross carelessness, heartlessness and dissipation’ of 
army surgeons.26 His complaint was only partly justified, since the tone of 
reporting was never uniformly negative.27 In the war’s early stages, the 
Cincinnati Lancet and Observer’s charge that far more was expected of army 
doctors than they were capable of delivering was generally appreciated. They 
‘were required to keep men well, to clothe them, to feed them, and to keep 
them from death’, and all this when they were ‘powerless to enforce sanitary 
laws, or to provide clothing or food’.28 Some of the criticism, indeed, was 
directed at those doing the complaining rather than at the targets of the 
complaint. It was an accepted fact, the New York Herald noted, that ‘invalids 
are generally grumblers, and that our sick soldiers form no exception to the 
rule.’29 
                                                 
26 J.N. Reach, ‘Army Surgeons: Their Character and Duties’, The Cincinnati 
Lancet and Observer, June 1863, 339-44, 339. See also, The Cincinnati 
Lancet and Observer, April 1863, 230; ‘Complaint of the Volunteer Surgeon’, 
New York Times, 25 September 1862; the Cleveland Plain Dealer, 20 October 
1862; and American Medical Times, 31 May 1862, 312. 
27 For more positive reports see, e.g., New York Herald Tribune, 23 July 1862; 
Philadelphia Enquirer,  24 July 1862; the New York Daily Tribune, 29 July 
1863; Dr George A. Otis, surgeon of the 27th Massachusetts Infantry to the 
New York Times, widely reprinted in, e.g., the Springfield (Daily) Republican, 
19 April 1862; and the Albany Evening Journal, 28 July 1862. 
28 The Cincinnati Lancet and Observer, April 1863, 230-1. 
29 New York Herald, 12 September 1862. 
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From the evidence of Letterman’s experience of conditions in the Army 
of the Potomac in 1862, of course, there are grounds for questioning the 
Herald’s claim that year that ‘the rations supplied to our soldiers in the field 
are the best in quality and the most abundant served out to any army in the 
world.’ The invalids in question may have had good grounds for grumbling. 
However, as the Herald acknowledged, negative reports of Union medical 
care fed into the agenda of ‘secessionist sympathizers’, who used them ‘to try 
and disgust our volunteers with the service’, thereby jeopardising the health of 
the main patient: the American nation. Consequently, although the paper 
acknowledged that Union medical provision was far from ideal, it nevertheless 
encouraged its readers to remember ‘that, if it is difficult to create a large 
army, it is still more difficult to create a medical staff commensurate to its 
wants.’ In common with Jarvis’s argument in the Atlantic Monthly, the 
message that the Herald wished to convey to a loyal, but, by the end of 1862 
already war-weary and increasingly cynical northern population, was that ‘by 
no government in the world is greater attention and care bestowed upon the 
soldier, sick or well, than there is by ours.’30  
That this positive narrative did not prevail may, at least in part, be 
ascribed to two main factors. First, there was never a clear distinction drawn 
between the sanitary and the surgical as far as reports of medical conditions 
in the field were concerned. Second, the negative narrative was of far greater 
value, in both political and practical terms, to the medical reform agenda; 
consequently it was promulgated by public and professional alike. When, in 
Congress in the spring of 1862, William M. Dunn, representative from Indiana 
                                                 
30 New York Herald, 12 September 1862. 
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and aide-de-camp in the Army of the Potomac, reported on the distressing 
conditions in the Union armies, he had little to say about supplies or sanitary 
conditions; his ire was directed elsewhere. ‘Our soldiers have suffered 
incalculably from the incompetency, neglect, and, I am sorry to say, the gross 
intemperance of some of the surgeons’, he advised the House.31 And 
throughout the war, the juxtaposition of criticism of ‘incompetent and shiftless 
surgeons’ with praise for ‘the usefulness of the Sanitary Commission’ not only 
elided the sanitary and the surgical, but in the process presented the USSC 
as succeeding where the surgeon had failed. The medical elite, of course, did 
not believe that it had failed. Indeed, it believed that the evidence, in the form 
of the ‘medical statistics of the entire army’ would show ‘that there has never 
been so small a mortality in any army.’ In this context, ‘the slander, 
misrepresentation and abuse’ directed at Union surgeons was especially 
galling.32  
It may not be surprising that, in the face of such perceived slander, The 
Cincinnati Lancet and Observer concluded that the medical profession ‘has 
been on trial during this rebellion’. It was essential, the journal argued, that 
Union doctors ‘demonstrate to the people of the country at large’ that the 
medical profession had ‘been misrepresented by newspaper correspondents, 
and the travelling busybodies, and enthusiasts of so-called sanitary 
commissions’, who ‘have exaggerated the mortality, decried the ability of the 
                                                 
31 William M. Dunn, House of Representatives, April 9, 1862, Congressional 
Globe, 37th Congress, 2nd Session, 1587. 
32 New York Herald, November 3 1862. On this point see also New York 
Herald, 13 January 1862. 
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medical staff, and have even charged a want of humanity to it.’33 In this 
regard, medicine’s bad press ultimately proved more benefit than hindrance 
because it was the negative narrative, above all, that challenged any residual 
complacency within the profession as to its short-term efficacy and its long-
term direction. ‘There is no class of men in this country who can exert a 
stronger influence, by united action, for any important object, than the 
members of the medical profession’, an American Medical Times’ editorial 
pronounced in the Civil War’s early months: ‘with union and action we can 
become irresistible. We can make and unmake legislators, governors, and 
legislatures, if we choose.’ The war swiftly exploded such early optimism. As 
the debates over Union medical care emphasised, even the choice of military 
medical provision was not necessarily the prerogative of the medical 
profession.34 
The tortuous progress through Congress of the ‘Wilson Bill’ of 1862 
was a case in point. Devised by the USSC but introduced by and named for 
Republican senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts, it was designed to 
centralise and streamline the Army Medical Department along allopathic lines. 
In her close analysis of the process and professional ramifications of this bill, 
Blustein noted that not the least significant aspect of the debates surrounding 
it was what these revealed about contemporary attitudes toward medicine and 
the consternation that the competing medical systems caused. Largely, what 
the debates over the ‘Wilson Bill’ revealed was the extent to which mid-
                                                 
33 The Cincinnati Lancet and Observer, April 1863, 230-1. 
34 ‘The American Medical Association’, American Medical Times, 22 February 
1862, 110-111, 111. 
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nineteenth-century Americans valued voluntarism, in matters medical if not 
sectional. Consequently, as medical reformers realised, the northern public, 
along with its politicians, was liable to prove as resistant as some doctors 
were to any attempt to impose uniformity on the medical profession.35   
The northern abolitionist publication, The Liberator, highlighted the 
depth of feeling on the subject when it commented on the Massachusetts 
Homeopathic Medical Society’s (MHMS) response to homoeopathy’s 
exclusion from the Union armies. Homoeopathy, it was asserted, was ‘a well-
tried and demonstrated system of medical practice’ an argument with which 
medical reformers were hardly likely to concur.36 For sanitary reformer and 
editor of the American Medical Times, Stephen Smith, indeed, as for many of 
his colleagues, the very idea that homoeopathic physicians should be 
accorded professional respect, let alone, as was suggested, discrete military 
hospitals dedicated to their particular brand of medicine was anathema.37 ‘We 
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do not know why this class of medical practitioners are honored with such 
distinction’, Smith sniped, ‘and we think other systems have a just cause of 
complaint in being overlooked by a Government which they equally support, 
and which all are anxious to serve.’38  
Smith’s argument was somewhat over-stated, since the other systems 
in question or, rather, the single, non-sectarian system was already the 
default position, given the orthodox background of most of the Union’s leading 
medical men. The scientific standing of homeopathic practice, however, was 
not the main public point of contention. For The Liberator it was about ‘fair 
play and common equity’. In supporting the homoeopathic claim for parity with 
orthodox medicine, the journal did so, as it emphasised, ‘on the ground of 
equal justice to citizens; just as we should protest against a rule admitting only 
Presbyterian, Baptist, Methodist, Swedenborgian, Unitarian, Universalist, or 
Catholic clergymen to officiate as chaplains, to the exclusion of all others.’ It 
‘does not follow’, it argued, ‘that, because the ‘old school’ or allopathic 
practitioners have hitherto had the entire management of the medical and 
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surgical treatment in the army and navy, therefore they ought to have this 
monopoly continued in their hands.’ Why, it enquired, should  those who, 
‘when at home, habitually employ homoeopathic physicians, in preference to 
all others, and who still desire to do so’, be ‘compelled to submit to treatment 
which they regard with aversion, because freedom of choice is tyrannously 
precluded; Why should such injustice longer continue? What constitutional 
right’, The Liberator demanded, ‘has allopathy over homoeopathy?’39 
Whilst The Liberator’s support for sectarian medicine may be regarded 
as aberrant by modern scientific standards, this was a journal whose 
abolitionist credentials lent its perspective some credence among those 
engaged in a war that, even in early 1862, looked set to tackle if not terminate 
chattel slavery. There had been a time, certainly, when The Liberator was 
positioned on the margins of even minority opinion, but the outbreak of civil 
conflict rendered it more mainstream, its editorial line more acceptable to 
northern audiences, and its concerns echoed by politicians. And in supporting 
what it regarded as straightforward ‘freedom of choice’ in medical matters, but 
couching it in First Amendment terms, The Liberator had touched on a much 
larger issue in the context of a conflict fought mainly by volunteer troops, 
citizen soldiers, not professional military men, whose patriotic understanding 
of what they owed their government did not necessarily mute their 
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expectations of what their government owed them.  At this stage in the 
conflict, with the war going badly for the Union and several states due to hold 
gubernatorial elections that year, accusations of governmental tyranny, in any 
context, could not safely be ignored.40 For supporters of medical reform such 
as Oregon Democrat James W. Nesmith, of course, taking into account ‘the 
tastes and notions and prejudices and predilections of every soldier’ seemed 
irrational; ‘it would be almost as sensible,’ he argued, ‘to introduce 
clairvoyancers, spiritual rappers, homoeopathists, and practitioners of all the 
other systems of medicine that are known at the present day, in order to 
satisfy the caprice of every soldier who may happen to be in the Army.’ For 
Iowa Republican Senator James W. Grimes, by contrast, the popular 
‘prejudice against…regular Army surgeons’ was reason enough to challenge 
any attempt to limit the medical options. It ‘is the duty of a statesman,’ he 
proposed, ‘to consult not only the reason of the people, but sometimes their 
prejudices’.41  
The Civil War, however, provided medical reformers a valuable 
weapon with which to sidestep the politics, cut through the confusion and 
tackle, simultaneously, both public prejudice and the sectarian argument. By 
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bringing into the public arena arguments that had, in the antebellum era, been 
confined to the professional one, the war created the context within which 
orthodox medicine, at least, could present its case, not just for short-term 
sanitary and surgical improvements, but for longer-term professional change. 
Within the new, public discursive space created by the conflict medicine’s 
scientific, and indeed its social, standing could be debated and defined, 
enabling medical reformers to advance their professional agenda along with 
the Union armies. So far from a damning indictment, the charge that the 
Union was fielding ‘the worst medical staff of any army in the world’ served to 
reinforce and reinvigorate the reform impulse.42 For medical reformers, there 
really was no such thing as bad publicity. As volunteer surgeon and Medical 
Director of the Army of the Ohio Henry S. Hewitt noted, in the context of 
conflict, the ‘country sees and recognizes the [medical] profession as it never 
did before.’ That it did not always like what it saw was, for Hewitt and for many 
of his colleagues, not a problem. It was an opportunity.43 
 
No Pain, No Gain? 
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At the war’s outset, northern public opinion largely concurred with the 
Secretary of War, Simon Cameron’s assertion that the nation’s ‘citizen 
soldiery…who have so promptly and patriotically left their homes in response 
to the call of the President and taken up arms in defence of the constitution 
and laws, and to vindicate and maintain American nationality,’ were ‘entitled to 
the tenderest care and most assiduous attention of the government in every 
respect; and most especially’, Cameron argued, ‘is it the duty of the 
government to promote their health and comfort.’ Medical reformers were 
swift to echo such sentiments.44 In defending the orthodox position, Smith, 
too, invoked those ‘citizen soldiers who have sacrificed the comforts of home 
in defence of their country’ in support of his case. ‘Around them’, he argued, 
‘Government should throw its protecting care, and tenderly guard their sick 
beds from the ruthless band of medical charlatanism.’45 By ‘making its voice 
heard for the protection of the health and life of the common soldier,’ Hewitt 
argued two years later, orthodox medicine could ‘assert its supremacy over all 
the forms of quackery and vindicate its claim to the gratitude of the nation, 
while it asserts its prerogative as the most enlightened and beneficent of all 
human institutions.’46 
Whether medicine really was ‘the most enlightened and beneficent of 
all human institutions’ was, as Hewitt well knew, hardly a given at the time. 
Physicians, proposed Theophilus Parvin, then president of the State Medical 
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Society of Indiana, were ‘representatives of medicine’, but he questioned the 
extent to which individual doctors were ‘causing men to honor us, and, in 
honoring us, the Profession to which we have consecrated all our energies 
and abilities. Is our culture, our growth in such direction’, he enquired, ‘as best 
to advance our chosen science, not merely in public esteem, but likewise in 
actual merit?’47 At least one of his colleagues thought not, but in this case the 
war itself provided the solution. ‘War,’ announced Union surgeon and medical 
pioneer Edmund Andrews, ‘is a moral tonic. It comes to the social world as 
the whirlwind and the earthquake come to the natural. It finds many flimsy, 
social fabrics in its path, erected for the time of peace…[and] bears them 
away like chaff in its passage, until that which is truly strong and giant-like, 
alone remains.’ For the American medical profession in particular, ‘summoned 
to the battlefield to front the grim realities of war’, Andrews saw an opportunity 
for renewal at a time when it, in common with others, had ‘grown up too rank 
and luxuriant for safety.’ The ‘shock of war’, Andrews believed, was a 
necessary corrective for the ills of a body politic rendered placid by peace, 
feminized by its good fortune, and consequently lacking the ‘manly character’ 
required for national security and international success.48 
In encouraging his colleagues to support the Union war effort, Andrews 
emphasised the risks, as well as the opportunities that the Civil War offered 
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them to develop their skills along with their courage. ‘In the Crimea,’ he told 
them, ‘the British surgeons dressed the wounds in the trenches where they 
fell; and the results’, he noted, ‘show that bullets have no natural repugnance 
to killing medical officers. Unless, therefore, a man can tie up an artery with a 
cool and steady hand, while the bullets are singing past him’, Andrews 
concluded, ‘he will not do for a surgeon.’ Invoking traditional eve of battle 
rhetoric, Andrews declared that the ‘ancient ideal of a true knight’ was ‘just 
about the real model for a surgeon.’ With the outbreak of civil war, Andrews 
declaimed, ‘God opens a new volume in the nation’s history, whose very first 
page is blazoned with war and carnage, and calls for men of sterner and 
loftier mould than before. Come up to the great work of the age’, he urged his 
medical colleagues, ‘and do your part like men.’ Andrews’ enthusiastic, 
possibly over-enthusiastic belief in the moral and medical benefits of the 
battlefield in the first few months of the Civil War may not, of course, have 
been shared by all his colleagues. Nevertheless, in its emphasis on surgery, 
specifically, as providing the path to medical and to national glory his 
perspective proved prescient; for both the northern public and for medical 
professionals alike it was surgery, above all, that symbolised Civil War 
medicine.49 
That the public perception of Civil War medicine was determined, 
indeed over-determined by its surgical side was obvious to many Union 
doctors at the time. That it has remained so should not, perhaps, surprise us. 
Although Rutkow suggested that the ‘pomp and circumstance’ surrounding 
conflict effectively masks ‘the deadly ferociousness of the battlefield’, in fact it 
                                                 
49 Andrews, ‘The Surgeon’, 588, 594, 598. 
 27 
was the most extreme physical outcomes of that ferocious reality that 
dominated the public and, some physicians feared, the professional 
understanding of the Civil War.50 The modern media adage, ‘if it bleeds, it 
leads’ was as true for the Civil War era as it remains today. This prompted 
one reviewer in the Cincinnati Lancet to express his relief at the appearance, 
in 1863, of Joseph J. Woodward’s volume on camp diseases in the Union 
armies. ‘We are right glad to have a work on military medicine’, he enthused. 
‘Surgery, surgery, surgery—the lopping off of arms and legs—the resection of 
this joint and that joint has been the great topic with men entering the army. 
The people too’, he added, ‘have estimated the army surgeon for his skill as 
an operator’, with the unfortunate result that medical students had 
increasingly ‘been unable to see any interest in a lecture unless it had 
reference to operative surgery.’51 
Although the reviewer of Woodward’s volume suggested that it would 
‘at least remove the delusion under which many have been labouring—that 
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the chief duties of the medical man are surgical’, he did so possibly more in 
hope than expectation, since the medical profession had been labouring 
under that particular delusion for quite some time. Fully a decade before the 
war, Henry J. Bigelow had identified both the public and the professional 
emphasis on surgery as potentially problematic. ‘Why,’ Bigelow enquired, ‘is 
the amphitheatre crowded to the roof…on the occasion of some great 
operation, while the silent working of some well-directed drug excites 
comparatively little comment?’ It was a rhetorical question, since Bigelow fully 
understood that ‘a surgical operation, even in the medical world, was apt to be 
looked upon with an undue appreciation.’ The ‘arbitrary interest’ in, and 
‘arbitrary importance attached to the performance of most surgical operations’ 
was, however, in his view, ‘disproportioned to their intrinsic merit.’ His advice 
to medical students in 1849 was that they should ‘aim at being competent 
pathologists and physicians’, rather than striving to comprehend ‘the various 
methods of performing an amputation of rare occurrence.’52 
The Civil War, of course, made amputation rather less of a rare 
occurrence than Bigelow’s perspective of a decade previously had allowed. 
And, perhaps inevitably, amputation fast became the symbolic wound of the 
war, to the detriment of the public, and sometimes professional, perception of 
those surgeons who performed the operations. In 1849, Bigelow had noted, 
with some degree of cynicism, that it was often deemed better for a surgeon’s 
reputation were he known ‘as the hero of extraordinary operations which have 
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proved unsuccessful, or even fatal, than as a follower of the usual routine of 
ordinary treatment.’ The conflict conditions pertaining during the Civil War 
hardly constituted ordinary treatment, but if any Union surgeon was hoping to 
acquire what Bigelow denoted the ‘notoriety which is a nucleus for surgical 
practice’ by performing what were often perceived as unsuccessful 
operations, it may appear, both from contemporary accounts and subsequent 
analysis that the war offered that opportunity in abundance.53  From the Battle 
of First Bull Run onwards, northern newspapers treated amputations 
seemingly as the sole measure of the severity of any engagement, of a 
surgeon’s skill, or more usually lack of it, and of Confederate maltreatment of 
Union prisoners of war. Whilst subsequent historians have traditionally 
focussed on the number of dead, for the northern press at the time it was the 
number of dismembered that served as shorthand for the struggle, and for the 
state of medical care during it.54 
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In this regard, northern newspapers were not entirely out of step with 
medical opinion. Many Union doctors would have concurred with Sylvester D. 
Willard, secretary of the Medical Society of the State of New York that the war 
coincided with a ‘new era’ not just in sanitary procedure but in ‘the science of 
military surgery.’55 And, given the contemporary fascination with surgery, it 
was hardly surprising that many medical men saw in the Civil War the 
opportunity, as one of the Union’s leading surgeons, John Shaw Billings put it, 
‘to acquire a reputation and surgical glory’.56 The Civil War, as Letterman 
pointed out, provided physicians a unique opportunity to acquire knowledge 
that would ‘go far toward filling the hiatus which exists in that branch of 
science in which we are now engaged, that of military surgery.’57 This would, 
according to Hewitt, allow the United States ‘to present the world with the 
most perfect system of military surgery that has appeared, and make our 
observation and experience the point of departure and the standard of 
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comparison for the future.’58 Only two years into the conflict, it seemed as if 
such ambitions were in the process of being realised. ‘It is quite evident’, 
observed one correspondent to the Cincinnati Lancet, ‘that since this unholy 
warfare commenced, military surgery has received such an impetus in this 
country that hereafter it will form an important part in the medical literature of 
the age.’ The Civil War, he argued, had opened ‘a wide field of observation, 
from which surgery gathers its rich and varied laurels. The destructive 
missiles of war are becoming our teachers’, he observed; ‘for in proportion as 
they mutilate the more important tissues of the body, so is the skill of our art 
taxed to repair the injury inflicted.’59  
Skill, however, seemed to be in rather short supply if the northern press 
was to be believed. Following the Battle of Antietam in 1862, for example, the 
New York Times suggested that Union medical support ‘would have disgraced 
the medical profession in the days when barbers monopolized the skill and 
science of the healing and surgical arts’, and presented its readers with the 
image of surgeons who ‘seized with morbid avidity the opportunity to test their 
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dexterity with the knife.’60 The New York Herald, too, was scathing about what 
it regarded as the ‘incompetency of army surgeons.’ Nothing, the paper 
charged, ‘has been more common than for amputation to be resorted to 
where it was not at all necessary, and instances have even been known’ 
when the surgeon ‘was so drunk that he took off the wrong limb.’61 In light of 
such damning indictments, it was hardly surprising that Letterman concluded, 
in some dismay, that the public believed battlefield surgery to be ‘butchery.’ 
Gross misrepresentations of the conduct of medical officers have been made 
and scattered broadcast over the country’, he complained, and ‘because of 
the incompetency and short-comings of a few’ a great ‘injustice’ to the many 
had been perpetrated.62 
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Letterman’s suggestion, however, echoed by many of his colleagues, 
that it was a case of the many being blamed for the mistakes of a few 
sidestepped one of the main issues that exercised the public and the medical 
profession alike over the course of the war: the fluctuating quality of medical 
provision. Although Bollet, among others, has argued that Civil War medical 
care ‘evolved during the war as surgeons learned from experience’, at the 
performative level medical expertise remained erratic at best for the duration 
of the war.63 The bureaucratic structures that were put in place, and that 
supported the medical framework for improved sanitary and surgical care 
undoubtedly represented an improvement over the war’s early medical chaos. 
Over the course of the conflict, however, these did not necessarily secure 
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either the consistency or continuity of care that contemporary medical elites 
envisaged, or subsequent scholars have sometimes assumed. In part it was a 
personnel problem, as was noted at the time by one observer from the 
London Medical Times and Gazette embedded, to use modern terminology, 
with the Army of the Potomac. Many surgeons left the army, he noted, just at 
the point when they had acquired enough experience to be useful. And it was 
this continuous renewal, this replacement of experienced by inexperienced 
personnel that caused the deterioration in medical care in the last years of the 
war.64 
Within the profession, concern over the character of those attracted to 
such vacancies echoed antebellum arguments regarding both the suitability 
and the expectations of those drawn to the medical profession generally, and 
especially its surgical side. Surgery was deemed, even by those like Andrews 
who advanced what might be termed a robust medical masculinity derived 
from surgical performance rather than sanitary practice during the Civil War, 
potentially problematic in the broader context of medical modernisation more 
generally. ‘As surgical appliances are less complex, and more easily 
understood than medical, so surgeons, on the average, are more clear and 
accurate in their ideas than physicians’, he argued, ‘and less in danger of 
running away into obscure theories, which neither are, not can be definitely 
proved. Even quacks’, he suggested, ‘are obliged to keep somewhere near 
the truth, when they meddle with surgery.’ This, however, meant that ‘many 
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inferior men,’ men ‘not possessed of enough philosophical power to grasp 
easily the truth of medicine’, and whose knowledge was subsequently 
‘superficial and narrow’ were drawn to ‘the surgical ranks.’ Too many 
surgeons, it was commonly believed, by layman and professional alike, had 
little ‘conception of the sacred duties of their calling’, and entered Union 
service from purely ‘selfish and mercenary motives.’65 Some did so, another 
observer believed, simply in order to acquire a commission ‘which they intend 
using as a reputation trap to snare patients.’66 
In respect of surgery overall, public concerns again frequently 
coincided with professional ones. This meant that the popular opprobrium 
directed against Union surgeons on the battlefield could be redirected toward 
the argument for a coherent medical educational curriculum on the home-
front. As such, the ‘monstrous fabrications of the newspaper correspondents’ 
provided a useful foil for those physicians who viewed with some suspicion 
the apparent ‘mania’ among some of their colleagues ‘to perform exsections’ 
and amputations, or to regard ‘a resection of simple nature, amounting only to 
a dressing’ as ‘an exsection of great magnitude.’67 If, in some respects, the 
Civil War served only to confirm the suspicions of those who believed, as 
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Bigelow had, that ambitious surgeons, in particular, ran the risk ‘of 
exaggerating a case in the presence of those who are competent themselves 
to judge’, it also offered the opportunity for surgeons to modify the popular, 
and largely negative perception of surgery. In 1849, Bigelow had assumed 
that years ‘must elapse before the surgeon will cease, as he must ultimately 
cease, to be identified with pain.’ The Civil War effectively fast-tracked, indeed 
in many cases rendered almost nugatory, the ongoing professional debates 
over one particular aspect of contemporary surgical procedure: anaesthesia.68  
Even as medical journals continued to publish letters and articles 
detailing the desirability, but also the dangers of anaesthesia, on the 
battlefield and in the hospitals of the Civil War discussion was a luxury that 
few surgeons could afford. As countless reports and requisition orders attest, 
both ether and chloroform were regarded as ‘indispensible’ by those surgeons 
facing the aftermath of yet another military engagement.69 And whilst positive 
reports of the impact of anaesthesia on Civil War surgery in the popular press 
were somewhat swamped by negative, and largely sensationalist accounts of 
amputation, popular accounts of anaesthesia’s ability to render surgical 
procedure more palatable, for patient and surgeon alike, did exist.70 In many 
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respects, indeed, the widespread use of anaesthetics during the war 
sustained, and in a sense brought full-circle, popular understandings of the 
symbiotic link between the martial and the medical, the soldier and the 
surgeon, in modern warfare. Men ‘fight better’, one correspondent writing in 
1864 proposed, in an echo of Scientific American’s argument in 1861, ‘when 
they know that torture does not follow a wound.’ The absence of even ‘one 
twinge of pain’, he asserted, ensured that ‘numberless lives are saved that the 
shock of the knife would lose to their friends and country.’ Nothing, he 
concluded, ‘could more perfectly demonstrate the value of anaesthetics’, than 
their use during the Civil War; they relieved ‘the soldier from untold misery, 
and his friends from untold anguish.’71   
 Given the relative lack of popular, press coverage of its use, it may 
seem unsurprising, if possibly apposite, that the benefits of anaesthesia 
should have fallen victim to a particularly persistent strain of forgetfulness as 
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far as the national narrative of the Civil War is concerned. As Bollet so pithily 
put it, even modern assessments of the Civil War can still give the impression 
that, as far as its surgery was concerned, one ‘might believe as many bullets 
were bitten as fired.’72 Even at the time, there was an obvious contradiction 
between the persistent public perception of Civil War surgery as butchery, and 
the growing professional determination to render surgical procedure less of an 
ordeal than it had been when the belief that ‘the more a patient cries and 
groans during a surgical operation, the more likely he is to survive it’ 
pertained.73 Yet this contradiction revealed a more fundamental truth about 
Civil War medicine, one that Martin Pernick highlighted when he identified a 
‘new willingness’ among ‘conservative physicians to inflict some harm for the 
relief of suffering’ as originating in ‘midcentury social criticisms of professional 
callousness.’ For Pernick, whose focus was on the ethics of medical 
professionalisation, the ‘doctor’s choice between the pros and cons of 
anesthesia depended…on a synthetic, utilitarian measurement of the ‘lesser 
evil’—a calculus of suffering.’ In this respect, however, the professional 
compromise paralleled the public one.74 
                                                 
72
 Bollet, Civil War Medicine, 79. 
73
 Godey’s Lady’s Book, May, 1854. 
74 Martin S. Pernick, ‘The Calculus of Suffering in Nineteenth-Century 
Surgery’. The Hastings Center Report, 1983, 13, 26-36, 31; Pernick,  A 
Calculus of Suffering: Pain, Professionalism and Anesthesia in Nineteenth-
Century America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 122; the 
figure for the number of operations using anaesthesia given in the MSHWR is 
c.80,000, although given the time lapse between the war and the publication 
 39 
 In assessing popular assessments of medical ‘callousness’, Pernick 
highlighted the growth, in mid-nineteenth-century America, of two apparently 
competing social, moral and, by extrapolation medical constructs that he 
defined as ‘romanticism and antiromanticism’. Between the two, he argued, 
there ‘existed a profound dialectic of pain’, precisely because they were not 
mutually exclusive. ‘To regard either the sentimental benevolence of Dorothea 
Dix or the mechanical, ruthless efficiency of William Tecumseh Sherman as 
uniquely characteristic of midcentury America’, he stressed, ‘would be to 
overlook the process of polarization by which each helped produce and define 
the other.’75 The combination of personal ambition and professional and 
national pride that medical reformers such as Letterman and Hewitt evinced 
may not be construed as sentimental as such, far less romantic. 
Nevertheless, for them, the knowledge that medical care could improve upon, 
in Hewitt’s words ‘the days of Pepin, Clovis, and Charlemagne’, sustained 
their efforts toward such improvement over the course of the conflict.76 
For the northern public, however, the ‘new form of masculine 
insensitivity’ that Pernick perceived as personified by Sherman did not really 
begin to assert itself until many years later. Even then, the view of the Civil 
War as ‘mechanical butchery’, a conflict in which ‘combat was reduced to a 
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meaningless hell’ owes more to subsequent wars, and especially the First 
World War, than it does to America’s civil conflict.77 During the war itself, the 
butchery was regarded as medical, not mechanical. Although, and again in 
the context of the use of anaesthesia during the war, Stephanie Snow has 
argued that its ‘humane influence upon surgery boosted the integration of 
nursing with military medicine by making more palatable the blood and gore of 
war and its injuries to feminine sensibilities’, the trauma was hardly gendered. 
A more widespread impetus to derive some meaning from the slaughter, to 
view the Civil War as a particularly brutal form of national salvation drama, 
largely determined the northern public’s response to the conflict and to 
medicine’s role in it. Between the positive and negative narratives of northern 
medicine at war, in effect, a rather different calculus of suffering was 
constructed through which public and professional alike calibrated, and tried 
to come to terms with the human cost of Union.78 
 
Conclusion 
 
Ultimately, in assessing the impact of the negative narrative of Union medical 
provision, it must be emphasised that the Civil War only exacerbated an 
already existing public and professional relations problem. As Gert Brieger 
has noted, medicine was frequently the subject of ‘bitter denunciation and 
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ridicule’ in the mid-nineteenth century United States.79 This state of affairs 
was hardly conducive to the medical reform agenda, but the Civil War, as 
many scholars have argued, altered the parameters of the debate and helped 
to secure an orthodox, professional coherence lacking in terms of antebellum 
medical training, practice, and intellectual outlook. It also provided the medical 
profession the opportunity to advance across several fronts: sanitary, 
scientific and surgical.80  
The extent to which the negative narrative informed much of this 
development, however, has been under-appreciated largely because the 
relationship between the professional and the public has been oversimplified. 
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In the context of the Civil War, the external, social dimension of medical 
modernisation has either been accorded an overly decisive influence or it has 
been sidelined altogether by too determined a focus on internal, scientific 
drivers. Although it has been argued that ‘public criticism’ in some indefinable 
way simply ‘forced improvements in medical care for troops’, in fact the 
relationship between public and professional was less direct and rather more 
discursive. Given that the Civil War was one fought mainly by volunteer 
troops, and that its medical provision was at least partly directed by an elite 
coterie of citizens in the form of the USSC, Union surgeons were hardly 
functioning within the kind of closed intellectual space that medicine later 
became. And over the course of the Civil War, they had cause increasingly to 
appreciate that there was a public dimension to the advancement of the 
medical reform agenda.81 
The argument for military medical reform as that played out in the 
popular press, professional publications, and political debate established 
Union surgeons on the front-line of the intellectual, social, and scientific 
changes already underway in a nation uneasily balanced between antebellum 
laissez-faire liberalism and the modernist organisational imperative of the 
Gilded Age and Progressive eras. And since medicine’s organised, public 
voice became, albeit temporarily, filtered through military channels, directed 
toward national ends, medical reformers like Smith and Hewitt understood 
that in the Civil War they had an opportunity to advance those reforms that 
had long exercised them. Their attack on professional sectarianism, in 
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particular, gained moral, material and managerial momentum from the 
national defence against political secession. In this respect, the central figure 
of the citizen-soldier, with all the patriotic, voluntary, and individual idealism 
that he implied, became the crucial catalyst, the means to medicine’s 
professional ends. By aligning the health of northern troops with that of the 
nation as a whole, medical reformers established a new professional and 
public discourse that equated the national body with the individual soldier’s 
body with themselves as defenders of both. 
The Union physician’s role within this discourse was, however, a 
complex one. Located at the confluence of competing interpretations of the 
larger meaning of the Civil War, from a northern perspective, Union doctors 
carried the full weight of public and professional certainties concerning the 
superiority of American military and medical power at a time when the future 
of the nation itself seemed uncertain. Towards the war’s end, and in the years 
that followed, many Union physicians believed that they had, for the most 
part, and in the face of considerable odds, met those expectations. The Civil 
War, the Cincinnati Lancet observed, had been ‘of the saddest interest to our 
profession from its first incipiency. The surgeon on the battle-field and in the 
prolonged tedious days of the hospital’, the journal noted, ‘is the one above all 
others who has been brought into constant painful contact with the suffering 
results of conflict, disease and privation.’ Looking forward to the war’s end, it 
also looked forward to the commemoration of medical efforts during it. 
Nothing, it concluded, would be ‘more worthy of an enduring remembrance.’ 
And yet, by the time of the war’s semi-centennial, even as the old soldiers 
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prepared for their reunion at Gettysburg, it seemed that remembrance had not 
endured.82 
For one of the north’s most noted physicians, Silas Weir Mitchell, this 
was nothing short of a tragedy. Addressing an audience in 1913, he 
highlighted the silence on the subject. ‘We gain nowhere a sense of the 
immensity of the task which as a profession we dealt with’, Mitchell 
complained. ‘We hear little or nothing of the unequalled capacity with which 
we met the call on energy and intelligence’, he added, far less any 
acknowledgment of ‘how perfect was our achievement through those years of 
disaster and final triumph.’ This, of course, was the professional, positive 
perspective on Civil War medicine, but it was public, not professional 
recognition that Mitchell was seeking. ‘Every village has its statue to the 
private soldier’, he noted, with some bitterness, but there ‘is not a state or 
national monument to a surgeon.’ Professional status, it seemed, did not 
translate into public recognition. Yet in bemoaning the absence of statues, 
Mitchell was perhaps missing the point. The many soldier statues erected 
across the nation in the decades following the conflict were largely reminders 
of the war dead. Mitchell might have taken some comfort from the fact that the 
lack of any medical monument was probably not the logical result of the 
negative narrative of Civil War medical care but rather the opposite; it 
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suggested that, in the public mind at least, Civil War medicine was mainly 
associated with the living.83 
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